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Abstract: We analyze vertical structures where a regulated network operator serves 
n network users, and the network users compete in quantities for customers. We 
distinguish two cases: (i) none of the network users are related to the network 
operator (ownership unbundling), (ii) one of the network users is partially integrated 
with the operator and the others are disintegrated (legal unbundling). We seek to 
understand when ownership unbundling leads to lower customer prices, and 
formalize necessary conditions. In general, legal unbundling implies a less effective 
regulation, but it reduces the degree of market distortion caused by the difference 
between marginal costs and average costs (= regulated prices of network usage). 
We find that the necessary condition is not satisfied for realistic values of the relevant 
parameters, i.e. legal unbundling leads to lower costumer prices than ownership 
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I. Introduction 
 
Gas, electricity, railway, and other networks exhibit strong economies of scale and 
scope.  Such  networks  are  the  prototypes  of  natural  monopolies,  and  it  is  widely 
agreed  that  splitting  up  such  networks  is  connected  with  higher  costs  than 
maintaining a regulated monopoly (in a certain region and depending on whether 
they  are  for  transmission/transportation  or  retail,  see  e.g.  Leautier,  2001).  The 
regulation is to ensure that the network users are offered access at “competitive” 
prices and without discrimination (neither with respect to price nor to availability).  
 
Historically,  the  networks  have  been  vertically  integrated;  they  are  owned,  for 
example, by the producers (importers) of electricity (gas). Hence, a prerequisite for 
regulated common access to the network is unbundling the network services from 
other business fields. Unbundling may come in three (or four) degrees: 
 
1.  Accounting/functional  unbundling:  The  firm  remains  integrated  but  re-
organises its book-keeping so that the costs of the network services can be 
identified. 
2.  Legal unbundling: The network services are provided by a separate firm. It is 
still  connected  with  the  production  and  trade  activities  of  the  previous 
integrated firm via a holding structure (see Figure 1). 
3.  Ownership unbundling: In addition to legal unbundling, the holding company 
has to sell either its network or both its production and trade arm. 
 
Legal unbundling is the minimal requirement in most (EU) countries with respect to 
energy  networks.  Accounting  unbundling  is  reserved  for  small  utilities  ( 000 . 100 <  
customers in Germany), and only a few countries have (thus far) passed legislation 
requiring  ownership  unbundling  (as  England  and  Austria  have  for  transmission 
networks). In a number of countries, it is discussed, however, whether the minimal 
requirement should be increased to ownership unbundling (e.g. in the Netherlands 
and  in  Germany).  Amongst  others,  the  European  Commission  supports  such  a 
transition  and  argues  (Energy  Sector  Enquiry-Issues  Paper,  DG  Competition 
15/11/2005, clause 28) that “The UK market experience of full ownership unbundling 
suggests that it significantly changes the behaviour of the transport undertaking: a 
  4
fully unbundled TSO will focus on optimizing the use of its network.” Recently, also 
the  EU  commissioner  for  competition,  Neelie  Kroes  (2006),  explicitly  required 
















Figure 1: A legally unbundled energy provider (Network company, Trader 1) and a 
competitor (Trader 2). 
 
The main advantages of stricter unbundling are (see Tönjes, 2005): 
 
(i)  Less incentives/opportunities for discrimination. 
(ii)  Less incentives/opportunities for cross-subsidising. 
(iii)  A more effective and efficient regulator. 
 
Points (i) and (ii), in particular, constitute opportunities to cheat and decrease the 
effectiveness of the network regulation. In contrast to accounting unbundling, legal 
unbundling diminishes these opportunities, but a transition to ownership unbundling 
would remove them altogether. In this paper, we model the transition from legal to 
ownership  unbundling,  and  based  on  the  formal  results,  we  discuss  the  relative 
merits of these regimes.  In the model, we concentrate on analyzing the impacts of 
cross-subsidisation (point ii) and regulation effectiveness (point iii). That is, the model 
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neglects the potential impact of explicit customer discrimination. On the other hand, 
we also neglect the following disadvantages of ownership unbundling (Tönjes, 2005): 
 
(iv)  one-time costs related to ownership change, 
(v)  reduced credit ratings of the resulting smaller firms, 
(vi)  buyers outside the electricity (gas) business can be reluctant to buy such a 
network (resulting in a unsatisfactory market price). 
 
A  final  point  is  that  legal  unbundling  improves  the  information  flow  between  the 
network operator and its users (see e.g. Newbery, 1997). A model related to this is 
presented in Gilbert and Riordan (1995) and will be discussed below. 
 
The effectiveness of the network regulation varies with a parameter p. Its value is 
zero for ownership unbundling and positive for legal unbundling; and it represents the 
price  increment  (for  network  access)  that  results  from  the  reduced  regulation 
effectiveness under legal unbundling. That is, the profit transfers that are possible 
under legal unbundling imply that the costs of network access are  p + p  per unit, but 
only p   per  unit  under  ownership  unbundling.  (Profit  transfers  can  be  made,  for 
instance, by renting overpriced office space from another company of the holding 
firm.) The question that we address is: Does the improved effectiveness of regulation 
under ownership unbundling imply that the consumers are better off? The answer to 
this  question  is  not  a  clear  yes,  as  the  possibility  of  profit  transfers  under  legal 
unbundling implies a certain degree of vertical integration, and thus it reduces the 
implications of a phenomenon known as double marginalisation (Spengler, 1950). In 
double marginalization as well as in “average costs” regulation, allocative decisions 
are based on costs which are above marginal costs. 
 
In  principle,  the  existence  of  this  trade-off  (effective  regulation  vs.  double 
marginalization)  between  legal  and  ownership  unbundling  is  understood.  In  this 
paper, we model the transition from legal to ownership unbundling formally, to make 
the specific aspects of this trade off more transparent. Our model extends existing 
models in that we allow that a regulated network operator sells network access to 
network users competing in a Cournot fashion. That is, our study differs from existing 
studies in at least one of the following two dimensions. On the one hand, the network 
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operator  cannot  negotiate  bilaterally  with  the  network  users  about  the  price  of 
network access, and there is no explicit market mechanism that balances supply and 
demand  of  network  access.  For  general  studies  of  market  mechanisms  and 
negotiations in vertical structures see e.g. Abiru et al. (1998), Baake et al. (2004), 
and the references cited therein, and for applications to network competition see e.g. 
Joskow and Tirole (2000), and Leautier (2001). Thus, we assume “regulated third 
party access” (see Newbery, 2002), i.e. a regulator sets a “fair” price (rate of return 
regulation) or defines a “fair” price setting procedure (cap regulation) which, however, 
has to be colibrated after several years by “rate-of-return considerations”. Deviations 
from the “fair” price are possible by means of (secret) profit transfers. In our case, 
such deviations are possible only under legal unbundling for the network user that 
belongs to the same holding as the network operator.  
 
On  the  other  hand,  we  assume  that  the  network  users  compete  in  quantities  for 
customers, not in prices (see e.g. Laffont et al., 1998). In the spirit of Kreps and 
Scheinkman (1983), and related literature, we think of the equilibrium quantities as 
capacities, and thus we model the emerging market structure rather than the short-
term equilibrium prices. It will be clear that a Cournot model captures equilibrium 
capacities only in a stylized way, but as we shall see, even such a simple model will 
be able to provide significant insights into the relative merits of legal and ownership 
unbundling. 
 
The  answer  to  the  initial  question  (“Does  ownership  unbundling  imply  smaller 
consumer prices?”) depends on p  as discussed above, and on the fixed costs of the 
network  operator  (labelled  F   in  the  following).  In  general,  the  larger  p   and  the 
smaller  F  is, the more appropriate ownership unbundling is. The fixed costs  F  are 
relevant, since they define the difference between  p  (=average costs plus allowed 
return  on  capital)  and  f   (=marginal  costs  of  the  network  operator).  The  implied 
difference of  p  and  f  is relevant, in turn, as the profit of the network user integrated 
with the network operator (under legal unbundling) is not a function of the price set by 
the regulator,  p + p , but a function of the marginal costs  f .  The basic trade-off 
consists of the following two elements. (A) under legal unbundling, the integrated 
network user faces a price  p f < , and therefore, it supplies a larger quantity than the   7
corresponding firm would under ownership unbundling. (B) the competitors face a 
price  p p > +p  under legal unbundling, and therefore provide lower quantities under 
legal unbundling than under ownership unbundling. It depends on the relative values 
of  f ,  p , and p  as to whether (A) or (B) dominates.  
 
In  Section  II,  we  analyze  two  models  to  determine  when  ownership  unbundling 
implies lower prices, i.e. when effect (B) dominates. The first model is the outlined 
Cournot model, and the second model concerns a medium-term perspective of the 
transition from legal to ownership unbundling. In the second model, the incumbent 
has a dominant position and the market entrants constitute a competitive fringe. In 
Section III, we discuss the formal results with an eye on several existing networks. 
We argue that, in relation to  p, the values of  f  and p  are rather small in most 
cases,  which  implies  that  the  consumers  would  usually  be  better  off  under  legal 
unbundling. Section IV relates our results to the literature and offers a conclusion. 
 
 
II. Two models of legal vs. ownership unbundling  
II.1. General assumptions 
 
We assume that consumer demand is described by  
 
(1)  ) (x P p =  with  x as the total quantity provided.  
 
) (x P   is  assumed  to  be  decreasing  until  0 ) ( 0 = x P   for  a  certain  0 x ,  or  to  satisfy 
0 ) ( ® x P  for  ¥ ® x .  ) (x xP  is assumed to be a concave function, i.e. 
 
(2)  0 ) ( ' 2 ) ( " < + x P x xP . 
 
Eq. (2) implies that monopoly and equilibrium oligopoly prices exist. It is fulfilled for a 
fairly  general  set  of  demand  functions,  e.g.  for  linear  demand  functions  and  for 
a x x P = ) (  with  0 1 < < - a . In turn, for  1 - < a ,  ¥ ® ) (x xP  for  0 ® x  would result, i.e. a 
monopoly could realize arbitrarily large profits by supplying almost zero quantities. 
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A  single  network  operator  serves  the  market  (region).  Under  legal  unbundling,  it 
provides its service at the price  p + p , under ownership unbundling at price  p . Its 
costs are  x f F × + , where  x denotes the aggregate quantity of network services. The 
transportation of one unit of the good to a consumer requires one unit of network 
service. 
 
There are traders  n , , 1K  who are interested in using the network (e.g. in railway 
transportation, or to distribute gas or electricity) with marginal costs of  c per unit. 
Under  legal  unbundling,  Trader  1  and  the  network  company  belong  to  the  same 
holding company, and due to this he makes decisions as if his costs of purchasing 
network  services  were  f .  Under  ownership  unbundling,  the  market  structure  is 
symmetric, i.e. Trader 1 faces marginal costs  p  when using network services. 
 
 
II.2. An oligopoly model 
 
This subsection is concerned with a model where the incumbent trader (i.e. Trader 1) 
does not have a predominant position in the market. The traders  n , , 2 K  face prices 
equal  to  p + p   in  the  case  of  legal  unbundling,  and  p   in  the  case of  ownership 
unbundling (as indicated above, Trader 1 has costs  f  and  p , respectively). The 
marginal production costs of the firms  n , , 1K  are symmetric and equal to c. 
 
Firm i’s profit from supplying  i x  to the market is 
 
(3)  i i i i x a x P x G - × = ) (   
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unbundling   legal under    1 for   
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The best reply of i is the solution of 
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Eq. (5) is fulfilled because of Eq. (2) and the fact that  0 ) ( ' < x P  and  x xi < . This 
implies  that  ) ( ' ) ( x P x x P i +   is  decreasing  in  i x ,  and  thus,  using  j i j i x x ¹ - S = ,  if 
0 ) ( > - - i i a x P , then there exists an  i x  which satisfies Eq. (4). 
 
Adding up Eq. (4) for all i leads to 
 
(6)  ∑ = + i ia x nP x xP ) ( ) ( '    
 
Eq. (2) implies that the left hand side of Eq. (6) is a decreasing function of  x. In 
addition, we know that  ) (x P  approaches 0 for large x . Therefore, if the average  i a  is 
less than  ) (x P  for small  x, e.g. less than  ) 0 ( P  if  ) 0 ( P  exists, then Eq. (6) has a 
unique solution  * x . If a firm  i exists with  i a  greater than  *) (x P , then we obtain a 
corner  solution  where  this  i  supplies  zero  quantity.  In  this  case,  the  number  of 
players and Eq. (6) would have to be adjusted accordingly, and the average  i a  would 
decrease.  The  market  price  *) (x P   would  also  decrease,  and  the  equilibrium  * x  
would increase. We can see this after rearranging Eq. (6).  
 
(7)  ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
1
1
' x P a a x P n x P x n
n
i





Assume  that  n a a a £ £ £ L 2 1 and  ) (x P an > ,  i.e.  Trader  n  does  not  appear  in  the 
market. Eq. (2) implies that the left hand side of Eq. (7) is a decreasing function of  x, 
and thus, after omitting  ) (x P an -  on the right hand side,  * x  has to increase. 
 
Based on this general discussion, we can compare ownership unbundling and legal 
unbundling. In the case of ownership unbundling, we have  c p ai + =  for all firms, i.e. 
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) ( c p n ai i + × = S .  In  the  case  of  legal  unbundling,  f p n nc ai i + + - + = S ) )( 1 ( p ,  or 
f c a ai i + = = S 1  if  ) (x P c p > + +p . In the latter case,  p + + < < + p c x P f c ) ( . 
 
As the left hand side of Eq. (6) is a decreasing function of  x, the equilibrium quantity 
decreases if  i ia S  increases. Hence, the equilibrium price increases if  i ia S  increases. 
The  following  statement  exploits  this  to  characterise  the  relationship  between  the 
equilibrium prices for legal unbundling and ownership unbundling. 
 
Proposition 1: Legal unbundling implies smaller consumer prices q than ownership 
unbundling if 
 
(8)  p × - > - ) 1 (n f p   
 
Proof: If Eq. (8) is satisfied, then  i ia S  is smaller in the case of legal unbundling than 
in the case of ownership unbundling.￿ 
 
Verbally,  legal  unbundling  tends  to  imply  more  favourable  market  prices  than 
ownership unbundling, 
-  the smaller the regulatory ineffectiveness p is, 
-  the smaller the number of potential competitors  1 - n  is, and 
-  the larger the difference between the regulatory price p (including fixed costs 
and profits of the network company) and the marginal costs f of the network 
company are. 
 
In particular, legal unbundling is preferable if  0 = p . 
 
 
II.3. A model with a competitive fringe 
 
In most  cases  where  private firms  have  obtained access  to  networks  of  previous 
state  monopolies,  the  incumbents  remain  to  be  the  dominant  actors.  At  least,  it 
appears fair to say that for rather lengthy transition phases, market entrants would 
gain only small market shares. This is most significant in France, see Glachant and   11
Finon (2005), but applies also in Germany where, until 2004, only 6% of the small 
German industrial costumers (though 35% of the large industry) have changed their 
supplier of electricity (Commission of the European Communities, 2005). Similarly 
small percentages are reported for other European contries. Exceptions are UK and 
Norway  where  more  than  half  of  the  industrial  customers  changed  their  supplier. 
Therefore, we complement the long-term perspective provided above, the case of an 
oligopoly, with the medium-term perspective in this subsection, i.e. with the case that 
the  non-incumbent  firms  constitute  a  “competitive  fringe.”    Note  that  a  similar 
approach to distinguishing the “mature phase” from a “transition phase” of network 
industries can be found in Laffont et al. (1998), although for a different context of 
network competition. 
 
We model the aggregate behaviour of the non-incumbent firms through the supply 
function  ) ( r c q S - -   with  q  as  the  market  price  and  p r =   or  p + = p r , 
depending on the type of unbundling (see above). The incumbent Trader 1 charges 
the monopoly price for the residual demand  ) ( ) (
1 r c q S q P - - -
- , considering his 
respective marginal network costs  p a = or  f a =  (as above). 
 
The profit function of Trader 1 is 
 
(9)  ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
1
1 r c q S q P a q q G - - - - =
-   
 
The market price q is the solution of  
 





To simplify the notation, let us assume that  S  is the linear function  bz z S = ) (  with 
0 > b . Using  ) ( : x P q = ,  x q P : ) (
1 =









 we obtain 
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The  left  hand  side  of  Eq.  (11)  is  an  increasing  function  of  x ,  as  ) (
1 x P
-   is  a 
decreasing function of x , and  0 ) ( ' < x P . Thus, the larger the term on the right-hand 
side of Eq. (11), the larger the  x  that solves Eq. (11) will be, and the smaller the 
market price q. 
 
Proposition 2: In the case of a competitive fringe, legal unbundling leads to larger 
quantities and lower consumer prices if 
 















Proof: Compare the right hand sides of (11) for (a, r) = (p, p) and (a, r) = (f, p + p). ￿ 
 
Finally, note that  0 ) ( ' < x P  implies that Eq. (12) is fulfilled if 
 
(13)  p > - f p . 
 
Thus,  Eq. (8) implies Eq. (13), and thus it also implies Eq. (12): if legal unbundling 
leads to preferable consumer prices in the long-term perspective (in the oligopoly), 
then  ownership  unbundling  cannot  be  preferable  in  the  transition  phase.  In  other 
words, legal unbundling is preferable in the long term only if it would be preferable in 




III. Application of the model 
 
Legal unbundling implies smaller consumer prices than ownership unbundling (i) in 
the long term if Eq. (8) is satisfied, and (ii) in the medium-term transition phase if Eq.   13
(13) is satisfied. Moreover, Eq. (13) is a necessary condition for Eq. (8), and they 
coincide  if  2 = n .    In  this  section,  we  discuss  under  which  conditions  one  would 
expect that the necessary condition Eq. (13) is satisfied. This discussion extends to 
the long-term scenario if the expected number of players  n with significant market 
shares would not be too large, but it extends also if the transition phase is rather long 
and  the  consumers  (or,  perhaps  the  government  considering  the  transition)  are 
sufficiently impatient. Unfortunately, there is not enough experience with networks 
that are deregulated for a sufficiently long term in order for a true oligopoly market to 
have been established (as mentioned, most networks are still in the transition phase). 
Therefore, such a discussion would be speculative at this point. In the rest of this 
section, we shall concentrate on discussing Eq. (13). 
 
III.1. Costs and regulated prices  
 
First, we want to emphasise that p does not measure inefficiency of producing the 
network service – in fact there is no such inefficiency in our model (only allocative 
inefficiency) – but ineffectiveness of regulation. It will be clear that the provision of 
network  services  is  rarely  completely  efficient  (in  particular  in  the  case  of  retail 
networks), but such inefficiencies are not necessarily associated with the unbundling 
regime.  Ideally,  a  scheme  of  incentive  regulation  is  chosen  such  that  the  market 
operates  efficiently  and,  theoretically,  this  can  be  achieved  independently  of  the 
unbundling regime.  
 
In our model, the costs of network services can be separated into fixed costs and 
variable costs. In the case of rate-of-return regulation, the rate base K  (= “used and 
useful”  capital)  and  the  variable  costs  v  (“prudent”  outlays)  would  have  to  be 







 with  x as 








, and therefore ownership unbundling is preferable to legal unbundling 
in the sense of Eq. (13) if  
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Capital costs are dominant in networks – 80% is a rough but adequate estimate (they 
are  larger  in  high  voltage/high  pressure  networks  for  distance  transportation  and 
lower in retail networks). Hence, ownership unbundling is preferable only if p is larger 
than  80% of  p . To illustrate this, ownership unbundling would be preferable only if 
its increased effectiveness implies that the price drops by 44% (from  p p 8 . 1 = +p  to 
p ).  We assume that this would be the exception rather than the rule. 
 
Under  cap  regulation  and  under  yardstick  competition,  the  network  operator  is 
provided  with  incentives  to  operate  efficiently.  However,  under  cap  regulation  he 
would generally not be motivated to remove the ineffectiveness p. The price  p  would 
regularly be readjusted, and if the regulated company succeeds in substituting its 
efficiency gains through increased ineffectiveness p, then it does not need to fear 
stricter cost saving requirements in the next cap period. The incentive to keep p high 
in yardstick competition is lower than in cap regulation, but again it would be higher 
than 0.   
 
Thus, if combined with a sufficiently ineffective variant of rate-of-return regulation or 
cap  regulation,  ownership  unbundling  might  be  preferable  to  legal  unbundling.  In 
combination  with  an  effective  (i.e.  incentive  compatible)  variant  of  regulation 
however, legal unbundling would generally be preferable. 
 
Finally, let us consider the case that the network capacity is exhausted (e.g. in peak 
periods).  Then  Trader  1  would  not  consider  the  short-term  marginal  costs  of  the 
network  operator  (under  legal  unbundling),  but  he  would  consider  the  (long-term) 
variable costs, i.e. marginal costs close to  p . Then, and depending on how often 
peaks reach the capacity constraint, the advantages of legal unbundling would cease 
to exist. In such cases, the regulator would demand capacity expansions, regardless 
of which unbundling scheme had been chosen (and in general, it is well understood 
that scarcity of network capacity is one of the main obstacles to competition among 
the network users, see Leautier, 2001, for a formal discussion and a review of the   15
literature, and also Newbery, 2002). In addition to such external motivation, however, 
the network operator would be more interested in extending the capacity under legal 
unbundling  than  under  ownership,  because  Trader  1  has  a  stronger  effect  on 
competition  under  legal  unbundling.  Hence,  the  frequency  of  peaks  reaching  the 
capacity constraint is lower under legal unbundling. 
 
In the following subsections, we discuss specific networks in more detail, to give an 
impression of the actual magnitude of p  in relation to  f p - .  We will conclude that 
p  is typically less than  f p -  by an order of magnitude which suggests that legal 




III.2. Railway transportation in Germany and Europe  
 
Germany has witnessed several years of fierce discussions about the privatization 
scheme  that  would  be  applied  to  the  state-owned  DB  (Deutsche  Bahn).  The 
management  of  DB  and  the  dominant  unions  are  vigorously  in  favour  of  legal 
unbundling,  while  the  German  monopoly  commission  (Monopolkommission,  2006) 
clearly favours ownership unbundling (to keep the rail as public property and privatise 
the rest of DB). The argument of those favouring legal unbundling is the “loss of 
economics of scope,” but their main fears appear to be the loss of market power and 
laying off of staff of the disintegrated network and transportation companies. In the 
following discussion, we concentrate on the situation in Germany, but the arguments 
and the conclusion apply more or less to most other European countries. 
 
The railway services in less densely populated regions have to be subsidised heavily. 
So extending the network is not an issue. Even the usage of the rails between the 
two  largest  German  cities,  Berlin  and  Hamburg,  is  far  from  being  exhaustive. 
Moreover, in contrast to pipeline transportation the adjustment of capacity can be 
made only in discrete steps. The maximum speed that a track allows is a qualitative 
attribute and can not easy be used to fine-tune capacity. 
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This  suggests  that  f   is  negligible  in  relation  to  p   in  the  case  of  railway 
transportations.  Furthermore,  competition  is  not  yet  existent  and  will  continue  to 
constitute a competitive fringe for years to come. Both of these facts strongly support 
the case for legal unbundling, while the regulator should concentrate on the task of 
keeping p low. 
 
 
III.3. Electricity in Germany and in Europe  
 
Electricity  is  the  sector  with  the  most  significant  progress  in  unbundling  and 
competition. Nonetheless, even in the most competitive segment, of large industrial 
customers, only in 7 of the EU-25 counties the incumbents defended less than 2/3 of 
the  market  (Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  2005) .  So,  in  most 
countries, the competitive fringe model seems to be justified. 
 
The  German  regulator  Bundesnetzagentur  recently  published  cost  comparisons, 
based on data submitted by the regulated networks. The data had been classified 
according  to  the  voltage  of  the  lines,  customer  density,  and  with  respect  to  the 
location (former GDR or not). The cost differences within these classes are huge. 
The ratio of max cost/min cost ranged from 2.64 to 31.07 for low voltage networks 
and from 1.53 to 33.22 for high voltage networks (the ratios for three categories of 
medium voltages are similar). This suggests that the productive efficiencies differ a 
lot,  and  also  that  there  are  significant  differences  with  respect  to  the  networks’ 
attempts  to  establish  ineffectiveness  p.  Bundesnetzagentur  reacted  in  2006  by 
preventing  price  increases  for  network  services  and,  in  a  number  of  cases,  by 
requiring price reductions of up to 20%. On average, the network fees in Germany 
are nearly twice as high as in Great Britain or in Sweden; but based only on the 
above report, it is difficult to gauge to what degree this results from inefficiency or 
from ineffectiveness of regulation. In addition, the large German variance implies that 
many  German  utilities  have  costs  and  require  network  fees  not  above  those  in 
England or Sweden. 
 
The  most  efficient  network  class  appears  to  be  the  part  of  the  high  voltage 
transmission system that is run by the four big producers E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall, and   17
EnBW (EdF). In addition to possibly differing p, cost differences amongst these lines 
stem from the location (there are more new lines in the East, which implies a larger 
capital stock/rate base), and from the more difficult management of wind energy from 
northern  Germany  which  requires  more  ancillary  services  than  electricity  from 
classical  power  plants.  On  average,  however,  the  cost  structure  should  be 
comparable with that of the UK, which has a similar customer density and also large 
north-south flows in the network. Moreover, the transmission prices in the UK are 
rather similar to those in Germany (etso, 2005). Hence, the difference of regulated 
transmission  fees  under  ownership  unbundling  (England)  and  legal  unbundling 
(Germany)  is  negligible.  By  definition,  a  measure  of  this  difference  is  p .  We 
conclude  that  p   is  small  (if  not  close  to  0),  and  that  legal  unbundling  would  be 
preferable for transmission. 
 
 
III.4. The Gas Industry in Germany and England 
 
Competition in the gas industry has yet to develop in Germany. Although there are 
nine importing pipelines and 20% domestic production, there is restricted competition 
even  for  large  industrial  customers  (7%  changed  their  supplier  until  2004,  see 
Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  2005) )  and  practically  non-existing 
competition in the household sector. In England, the respective numbers are  >50% 
and 47% (Commission of the European Communities, 2005), but that seems to be an 
exception.  In  only  four  of  the  EU-25  countries  entrants  succeeded  in  conquering 
more  than  a  third  of  the  market.  This  suggests  again  that  (at  this  stage)  the 
competitive fringe model seems most appropriate.  
 
Similar  to  electricity  transmission,  there  are  large  cost  differences  between  the 
networks in Germany. The ratio between maximum and minimum costs in different 
classes lies between 2.5 and 15.6. 
 
In the past, the gas sector was far less regulated than the electricity sector. It was 
assumed that interfuel competition against oil and coal would keep the gas prices 
down. Gas to gas competition has hardly developed, however. The most important 
contract forms are the long-term (from several years up to 30 or 40 years) Take or 
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Pay  contracts  which  dominate  import  deliveries  as  well  as  deliveries  between 
pipelines  and  retailers.  Meanwhile,  in  Germany,  the  duration  of  contracts  with 
retailers is restricted to 2 – 4 years, but further measures are required to stimulate 
competition.  With  respect  to  import  contracts,  release  auctions  might  be  used  to 
increase  the  number  of  traders  in  the  market.  Currently,  for  instance,  DONG  (in 
Denmark) and Ruhrgas (in Germany) are obliged to offer considerable quantities in 
such  auctions  (see  also  Bolle  and  Breitmoser,  2006).  For  2002,  the  regulator 
Bundesnetzagentur  established  a  new  regulatory  framework,  and  thus,  it  appears 
advisable to postpone the (practically irreversible) transition to ownership unbundling 
until  the  implications  of  the  stricter  regulation  can  be  observed.  It  is  interesting, 
however,  that  for  large  customers,  network  fees  do  not  seem  to  differ  much  in 
European countries (European Commission, 2005). The prices in Germany display a 
rather  large  variance,  but  the  smallest  prices  in  Germany  are  comparable  to  the 
smallest  ones  in  Europe,  including  England.  The  comparison  with  England  (with 
ownership unbundling and auction prices for the transportation of large quantities) is 
most remarkable, as it suggests again that ownership unbundling is not a prerequisite 
for a small p. 
 
IV Discussion and Conclusion  
 
We  compared  the  implications  of  ownership  unbundling  and  legal  unbundling  in 
regulated networks, with an eye on the implied consumer prices. We have seen that 
ownership unbundling does not generally imply lower consumer prices. For realistic 
values of our model parameters (i.e. of  p  and p ), legal unbundling would actually 
imply more preferable consumer prices. 
 
This contradicts a widely held belief that ownership unbundling is preferable. One of 
its  main  advocates  is  the  European  Commission  who  regularly  refers  to  the 
successful  British  example  in  the  Electricity  and  Gas  industry  when  requiring 
ownership unbundling. At this point, however, one should note that the success of 
the  British  example  is  not  necessarily  a  result  of  full  disintegration.  For  instance, 
SERIS (2006) credits improvements in the gas network usage mainly to regulatory 
developments and not to disintegration.  
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Kwoka (2002) shows that disintegrated (American) utilities bear higher costs. Partly, 
this may be a result of double marginalization: the production/purchasing costs of 
highly integrated utilities (exporters of electricity) are only half of those of the least 
integrated  utilities  (importing  more  than  50%  of  their  supply).  To  a  large  degree, 
these cost differences (due to unbundling production and retail) can be expected to 
carry over to cases of unbundling production and transportation. With respect to the 
electricity sector, Newbery and Pollitt (1997) showed that from 1990 to 1996, the 
restructured sector became more efficient, but also that these efficiency gains did not 
lead to falling prices. In the period from 1996 to 2001 prices decreased in GB and 
from 1998 on also in Germany. 
 
Those observations do not constitute direct evidence for our model, as we compare 
ownership unbundling to legal unbundling (not to a fully integrated company), but 
they show that dissolving the vertical integration is not only theoretically problematic, 
but also empirically. In some sense, it may now appear that legal unbundling has the 
best  of  both  worlds.  It  maintains  a  certain  degree  of  vertical  integration,  but 
strengthens the competitive forces required for efficient production. This conclusion 
would, of course, be far too bold, given the simplicity of our model. In the following, 
we  briefly  discuss  related findings  from the  literature to provide a  more  complete 
picture of the situation. 
 
A large body of literature is concerned with the information asymmetries between the 
regulator and the regulated firms. In our case, the regulator is not informed about the 
costs  of  the  network  operator,  but  he  has  the  task of  setting  a  price  for  network 
access. A different model is presented in Gilbert and Riordan (1995) where, in a 
Principal-Agent  model,  a  customer/regulator  player  is  identified  with  the  principal. 
They consider two models, in one case a vertically integrated monopolist (provided 
network access and electricity), and in the other case two disintegrated monopolists 
(one providing the network access and the other one providing electricity). There are 
no other firms in the model. The technical problem (of the principal) is to write optimal 
contracts  under  incomplete  information about  the  costs  of  the firm(s).  Gilbert  and 
Riordan find that unbundling may (but not necessarily) be advantageous, based on 
an argument referring to double marginalization as in our model. The details of the 
argument differ, since the model differs (in a crucial way, as electricity generation is 
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not  subject  to  regulation  in  our  case),  but  the  main  reason  as  to  why  vertical 
unbundling threatens efficiency remains. 
 
We assumed that the network capacity is not scarce. Leautier (2001) shows that “a 
transmission company also involved in generation would strategically plan [under-] 
expansion of the transmission network [i.e. underinvestment], or fail to maintain or 
upgrade  portions  of  the  grid,  to  increase  its  profits”  (p.  47).  A  related  result  is 
provided by Joskow and Tirole (2000), who show that integrated firms may restrict 
access to transmission capacity in order to raise the profits of its production arm. This 
suggests that scarcity is inherent in legal unbundling, but the opposite conclusion is 
reached by Cremer et al. (2006).  We do not want to go into the details of this aspect, 
but simply remind that maintaining an adequate network capacity is crucial for an 
effectively operating market (see Newbery, 2002), and ensuring this is one of the 
main tasks of the regulator. Apart from this, the incentives to maintain and extend the 
network capacity are larger (in our framework) under legal unbundling than under 
ownership unbundling (see above). Hence, the network capacity would not be lower 
under  legal  unbundling  than  under  ownership  unbundling  (ceteris  paribus). 
Therefore,  even  in  cases  where  the  capacity  constraint  is  reached  under  legal 
unbundling (which would imply that the full potential of legal unbundling cannot be 
developed), the provided market quantity would not be less than under ownership 
unbundling (and hence the price would not be higher). Needless to say, this intuitive 
argument would have to be formalized in a corresponding framework, ideally in a 
dynamic model. 
 
Our  approach  in  modelling  the  transition  from  legal  unbundling  to  ownership 
unbundling  allows  for  two  phases:  a  transition  phase  where  the  non-incumbent 
network users constitute a competitive fringe and a mature phase where an oligopoly 
has  emerged.  We  argued  that  legal  unbundling  is  likely  to  be  preferable  in  both 
phases, and hence overall. This neglects the fact that the length of the transition 
phase  may  depend  on  the  unbundling  regime.  Due  to  the  asymmetric  market 
structure induced under legal unbundling, the mature phase may be reached more 
quickly under ownership unbundling. Hence, for some intermediate discount factors 
(i.e.  not  too  small  and  not  too  close  to  1)  ownership  unbundling  may  imply  a 
preferable discounted sum of consumer surpluses.    21
 
Finally, van Koten and Ortmann (2006) show that the degree of unbundling and the 
degree  of  corruption  (measured  by  the  Corruption  Perception  Index  CPI  of 
Transparency International) are negatively correlated. This suggests that lobbying is 
required to convince policy makers not to disintegrate the industry structure, and that 
the  lobbyists  (i.e.  the  incumbent  firms)  expect  to  benefit  from  higher  degrees  of 
vertical integration. This does not necessarily indicate that the consumers would lose 
out. Starting with Spengler (1950), a large body of literature seeks to explain when 
the commercial interests of firms are aligned with the interests of their customers. It 
has been shown that vertical integration does have positive aspects, and this study 
displays this result in the case of regulated networks with Cournot competition in the 
customer market. Further aspects remain to be analyzed, as discussed for instance 
in  Newbery  (1997),  but  at  this  point,  it  remains  debatable  whether  and  when 
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